Segregation, entrepreneurship and work values: the case of France by Senik, Claudia & Verdier, Thierry
Segregation, entrepreneurship and work values: the case
of France
Claudia Senik, Thierry Verdier
To cite this version:
Claudia Senik, Thierry Verdier. Segregation, entrepreneurship and work values: the case of
France. PSE Working Papers n2007-37. 2007. <halshs-00587718>
HAL Id: halshs-00587718
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00587718
Submitted on 21 Apr 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2007 - 37 
 
 
 
Segregation, entrepreneurship and work values: 
 
The case of France 
 
 
 
 
Claudia Senik 
 
Thierry Verdier 
 
 
 JEL Codes: J15, J61, J7, Z13 
 Keywords: Social capital, ethnic segmentation, work 
values, labor discrimination 
  
 
 
PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
LABORATOIRE D’ECONOMIE APPLIQUÉE - INRA 
 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TÉL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE NATIONALE DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES – ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
Segregation, Entrepreneurship and Work Values: the
Case of France∗
Claudia Senik
Paris School of Economics and University Paris IV
Thierry Verdier
Paris School of Economics, University of Southampton and CEPR
November 2007
(First Version)
Abstract
This paper studies the interaction between labor market integration, the evo-
lution of ”work values” and entrepreneurial capital inside minority communities.
A simple model of labor market segmentation with ethnic cap´ıtal and endogenous
transmission of cultural values inside the minority group is presented. It empha-
sizes the role of entrepreneurial capital as an important driver of labor market
integration and as a promoter of meritocratic work values inside the community.
The case of South european and North african second generation immigrants in
France is then empirically studied as an example, contrasting strongly how the
diﬀerential economic and cultural imtegration in the labor market correlates with
the diﬀerential level of entrepreneurial capital of the two communities.
1 Introduction
An intense political and intellectual debate is taking place in Europe around migration
issues. A major challenge relates to the process of labor market integration or segregation
of immigrants in the host economy. This issue is at the forefront of the policy agenda of
many western governments.
∗We thank the Lasmas-IDL (centre Maurice Halbwachs) for providing the 1999 French Census data
1999; we are grateful to Eric Maurin, He´le`ne Garner, Dominique Meda and Michel Gollac for their
useful remarks.
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An illustrative example is France where the segmentation of the labor market is nowa-
days one of the most important issues for the population and a major political challenge
for the government. This aspect is actually compounded by the ethnic divide along which
it is sometimes thought to operate. In particular, the diﬃculties that immigrants from
North Africa encouter on the French labor market are well-documented. They have been
shown to be both salient and in sharp contrast with the situation of other immigrants,
e;g. immigrants from Southern Europe (Okba and Laine, 2004, Silberman and Fournier,
2006, 2007, Joseph and Lemiere, 2005). Local concentration of youth unemployment
and urban unrest are the symptoms of this growing problem. For some observers, this
reveals the failure of the French republican model of social integration. For others, it
simply confirms the idea that particular minority groups have intrinsically ”cultural diﬃ-
culties” to assimilate and integrate into the French socio-economic system. With respect
to labor market issues, it is argued that, beyond traditional individual socio-economic
characteristics, diﬀerential rates of success in the labor market across communities may
actually be explained by diﬀerences in work values and job identity norms attached to
the communities1.
While plausible at a given point of time, this ”culturalist explanation” has been
attacked for its lack of dynamic perspective (Knocke, 2000). As a matter of fact it
leaves open the question of the sources of the diﬀerences in work values and job norms
in the first place and how these cultural elements tend to persist or change over time
within minority groups. In a dynamic perspective, an essential question is to understand
how labor market segregation and work values co-evolve within groups and how they
jointly determine employment outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
this issue both theoretically and empirically, focusing on the interaction between labor
market segmentation, the transmission of work values and the importance of ethnic
entrepreneurial capital inside minority groups.
More specifically, we start from the idea that ethnic segregation can be based on both
positive and negative motivations. One type of reason is solidarity, common destiny,
shared adversity. But many surveys also put in evidence the central role of information,
monitoring and control inside an ethnic group. In the limits of a small community, in-
formation is easier to acquire. The higher proximity of agents allows a better mutual
knowledge and a control exerted by everyone on everyone else, hence a greater eﬃciency
of the management of labour resources. By reducing problems of information and con-
trol, proximity reduces the management costs imposed by moral hazard, not only in
employment relations, but also in financing relations (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).
Hence, labour market segmentation is often associated with the constitution of a specific
ethnic social capital, which influences the integration of immigrants (Portes ed., 1995).
Spatial and professional segregation, in turn, generate their own externalities: imitation,
1Along this culturalist explanation line, see for instance Ram and Jones (1998) Barrett, Jones and
Mc Evoy (1996), Wilson and Portes (1980) for the case of South Asian ethnic business in Britain.
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signal sharing (stigma), diﬀusion of values and attitudes, etc. By determining the scope
of work values transmitted to the members of an ethnic minority, ethnic segregation
can be self-reinforcing. At the same time, the process of cultural transmission within
a minority group can also generate unfavourable features such as stigma and statistical
discrimination if the work values and attitudes of the group, as perceived by external
observers, are less productivity-prone (Phelps, 1972, Stiglitz, 1973).
The paper tries to embody these diﬀerent elements in a general view of labour market
integration of ethnic minorities. More precisely, we try to put in evidence the central role
of entrepreneurship in both the social capital and the genesis of work values of ethnic
minorities. To do this, we present a simple model that discusses such dynamics. Assum-
ing a certain degree of ethnic discrimination on the ”primary” general labour market
and the existence of a ”secondary” ethnic labor market, the model shows how ethnic en-
trepreneurial density, by protecting self-employed individuals from unemployment, can
play a crucial role in the transmission of work values, and therefore on the professional
integration of workers of foreign origin. We then illustrate the assumptions and predic-
tions of the model using an original French survey designed to study the work attitudes
of the French population and of its components in terms of immigration trends: Histoire
de Vie (INSEE, 2003). We also use the 1999 French population census, which reports
the origin, nationality and occupation of the inhabitants of each French region. Our
identification strategy is then based on the regional variation in the density of ethnic
entrepreneurship.
French data oﬀer a vision of the French labour market as an ethnically segmented one.
A first na¨ıve look at the raw data shows the particular situation of the North African
minority on the French labour market. Immigrants from this region are particularly
poorly integrated in the labour market; they experience higher rates of unemployment
and more instability; they also seem to attach less importance to their job, to consider
their job as a more minor motive of identity and to be less satisfied with it. These stylized
facts concerning the objective working conditions and the subjective work values of im-
migrants from Maghreb immediately point to two possible explanations: discrimination
and cultural factors.
This paper shows that the story is more subtle. Once the social capital specific to
each group of immigrants is taken into account, the specificity of immigrants from North
Africa in terms of work values totally disappears (it becomes statistically insignificant)
or is even reversed. Indeed, concerning the subjective statement that “work is important
as compared to other aspects of life”, it appears that immigrants, including the North
African minority, attach more importance to work than French natives, once the eﬀect
of the ”ethnic” social capital is controlled for.
These findings suggest that ethnic social capital plays an important role in shaping
people’s attitude towards work, and that entrepreneurial capital may be a key element
of social capital. Hence, work values and attitudes are not mechanically transmitted
from generation to generation, but depend on the professional structure of each group of
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immigrants. Labour market segmentation, entrepreneurship and work values are closely
intertwined, potentially generating dramatically diﬀerent trajectories across minority
groups. Given a particular macroeconomic environment, depending on their initial
conditions, minority groups may end up in vary diﬀerent long run situations in terms of
labor market integration, entrepreneurship and work values. Our analysis suggests that
this could partly explain the diﬀerent modalities taken by these aspects in the various
groups of immigrants in France.
It should however immediately be mentionned that these mechanisms do not consti-
tute a substitute to other explanations in terms of ethnic discrimination. Rather both
types of phenomena must be seen as complementary. Indeed, network eﬀects potentially
reinforce (or reduce) the stigma attached to each minority group, depending on the lat-
ter’s record in terms of labour market integration. Discrimination can also reduce the
motivation to work of concerned agents by creating the expectation that whatever their
eﬀort, the pay-oﬀ will remain low. Hence, the policy recommendation that would be
consistent with the view supported by this paper is not to minimize the importance of
discrimination, but to suggest an additional entry for public policy
The paper is related to various strands of the literature. First, there is a vast so-
ciological literature investigating the role of ethnic entrepreneurship in the pattern of
labor market integration of immigrants. Two main hypotheses are generally confronted.
The first one is the so-called ”step-ladder argument”, maintaining that immigrants’ em-
ployment in ethnic labor markets and co-ethnic firms is a way to acquire knowledge,
experience and further access into the ”primary” general labor market (Portes and Bach
1985, Portes and Manning 1986, Waldinger 1993). The alternative view is the ”ethnic
enclave” view, in which ethnic self-employment comes as the result of (expected or ex
post) discrimination in the ”primary” labor market and provides an avenue for economic
mobility in a ”protected or privileged” market (Aldrich and al.1981). Our analysis sug-
gests that the two views can be somehow reconciled in the sense that through the profile
of labor integration that it sustains, ethnic entrepreneurial capital promotes, as a by
product, the transmission of work values, which in turn help immigrants to better in-
tegrate into the ”primary general” labor market. Hence ethnic self-employment is at
the same time a shelter against labor market discrimination and a step towards better
integration in the future.
The paper is also obviously related to the economic literature on ethnic capital,
migration, and intergenerational mobility. As shown for instance by Borjas (1992, 1995),
skills transmitted to the next generation of immigrants depend not only on parental
investment but also on the ethnic capital of the community. This helps explaining the
diﬀerential rate of economic success of ethnic minorities in the US. Similarly, in our
framework, ethnic entrepreneurship capital interacts with the process of transmission of
work values inside the group, leading therefore to persistently diﬀerent trajectories of
ethnic minorities, depending on their initial conditions.
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Finally, the paper is closely related to the literature on cultural transmission and
socialization (Bisin and Verdier 2000, 2001) and its extensions to labor market discrimi-
nation and work habits as developed in Saez-Marti and Zenou (2005). This piece of work
is closest to this paper. It also investigates the dynamics of work values and the implica-
tions for labor market discrimination. Our paper diﬀers from theirs in two dimensions.
First, we emphasize the role of parents’ employment status in the process of transmission
of work values, while their model uses an extended version of the socialization model
of Bisin and Verdier (2001) with endogenous transmission rates chosen by parents who
decide to transmit purposefully their own trait to their oﬀsprings. Second, we explicitly
take into account the co-evolution between ethnic capital, ethnic self-employment and
work values, as a mechanism to further labor market integration in the ”primary” labor
market.
2 A simple model of labor market participation and
cultural evolution
In this section, we present a simple model linking the cultural evolution of work values,
integration in the labor market and entrepreneuship in a minority group. The basic idea
is to emphasize the fact that labor markets are segmented because of diﬀerential access
to information and enforcement capacity of firms and employers. Our starting point is to
assume a ”primary” labor market pool in which employers do not have access to relevant
information on individual workers’ characteristics and face a moral hazard problem. In
such a market, employers base their hiring decisions on workers’ expected productivity.
As such they use group observable characteristics (ie. geographical origin) to infer that
level of average productivity. When workers are substitute enough to each other, the
result is statistical discrimination across groups in access to jobs.
At the same time, we assume that workers may also be employed in their own ethnic
group (an ”ethnic enclave” labor market). In this informal/ethnic labor market however,
employers know all the relevant individual characteristics of their fellow ethnic members
and have access to an eﬃcient monitoring technology mitigating the moral hazard prob-
lem. The diﬀerentiation between the two labor market pools can be justified in the
following way. First, the ethnic labor market is directly related to close-knit community
links and networking which allow for fluid informational flows among members, eliminat-
ing therefore the asymmetry of information problem on individual productivity. Second,
within such networks, reputational concerns and threats of ostracization are important
devices that provide eﬃcient means to monitor and solve problems of moral hazard in
labor relationships2.
2Another aspect is that ”ethnic” employers are themselves submitted to a certain pressure to hire
workers of the same group; the other facet of ”social capital” in a way.
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2.1 Functioning of the primary labor market:
More precisely, we assume that the ”primary” labor market is characterized in the fol-
lowing way. There is one homogenous numeraire good produced under competitive
conditions and using some fixed factor of production KG and unskilled eﬃcient units of
labor H, with a standard constant return to scale production technology Q = F (KG, H)
3. In this labor market, workers are paid a fixed wage w.4
There are two types of workers in this market. First there is a so-called ”majority”
group, reflecting the majority of workers in society. Second, there is a particular minority
group which can be distinguished from the ”majority” workers using a publicly observable
characteristic (e;g. ethnic origin, language accent or way of speaking), the size of which
is normalized to 1. Whatever the group, each worker has an individual characteristic
related to his ”work values” or disutility of work eﬀort. For simplicity, we assume that
this characteristic can only take two possible values θL and θH with θL < θH and is
not observable to a firm operating in the ”general” labor market. More precisely, when
employed on a task, a worker can undertake an eﬀort which costs him a disutility θ = θL
or θH . When the eﬀort is secured, with probability 1, the worker is productive and he
supplies one unit of eﬃcient labor. When no specific eﬀort is undertaken, the worker is
only productive with probability p < 1. We assume that with some probability δ > 0,
the employer can observe ex post the performance of the worker and fire the worker if
he were not productive. The incentive constraint that induces eﬀort is then simply given
by:
w − θ ≥ w (1− δ(1− p))
or
w >
θ
(1− p) δ
To make things interesting we assume that
Assumption 1 :
θL
(1− p) δ < w <
θH
(1− p) δ
namely that at the fixed wage w, the high ”work value” worker (ie. with θL) provides
the eﬀort and is productive while the low ”work value” individual (ie.. with θH) does not
undertake the eﬀort5. We denote by q (and Q respectively) the proportion of workers
3We assume for simplicity that F satisfies the Inada conditions FL(KG, 0) = +∞ and FL(KG,∞) = 0
4Uemployment is a the heart of the model. A fixed minimum wage is a simple device to generate the
labor market rigidity that generates such a result. At the cost of increased analytical complexity, one
could have introduced other specifications (eﬃciency wages or unions wage bargaining) without altering
the basic conclusions of the paper.
5We assume as well that the minimum wage w is not too high, so that it is not profitable for
any firm to hire workers at an eﬃciency wage that ensure that workers of type θH do not shirk (ie.
w 1−(1−p)δp <
θH
(1−p)δ )
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in the ”minority” (”majority”) group with characteristic θL. When hiring L1 of workers
from the ”minority” group and LM from the ”majority” group, the profit of the typical
representative firm in this market writes as:
Π(KG, L1, LM) = F (KG, (q + (1− q)p)L1 + (Q+ (1−Q)p)LM)
−w [1− (1− q)(1− p)δ]L1 − w [1− (1−Q)(1− p)δ]LM
In the minority group, only individuals with characteristic θL are providing an eﬀort.
Hence (q + (1 − q)p)L1 is the expected number of productive labor units provided by
employing L1 workers from that group. At the same time, w [1− (1− q)(1− p)δ]L1
is the wage bill, given that the employer does not pay wages for all ”lazy” workers
(in proportion 1 − q) who are unproductive (with probability 1 − p) and found to be
so (with probability δ). Similarly, (Q + (1 − Q)p)LM is the expected number of pro-
ductive labor units provided by employing LM workers from the ”majority” group and
w [1− (1−Q)(1− p)δ]LM is the wage bill for that group. Maximization of profits give
immediately the labor demand or workers. Denote for this Ψ(.) the function such that
for all x, FL(1,Ψ(x)) = x It is immediate to see that Ψ(.) is a decreasing function. Then
the first order conditions of profit maximization provide imediately:
For q < Q, L1 = 0 and LM = L(KG, w,Q) (1)
For q > Q, LM = 0 and L1 = L(KG, w, q)
For q = Q, LM + L1 = L(KG, w, q)
with
L(KG, w, z) =
KG
z + (1− z)pΨ
"
w
1− (1− z)(1− p)δ
z + (1− z)p
#
(2)
being the labor demand for a group of workers with fraction z of ”high working” workers
with characteristic θL.
Equation (1) simply says that, given that workers are perfectly susbtituable, only
workers with the lowest eﬀective wage per unit of eﬃcient labor units will be employed .
Typically for a group with a fraction z of ”high working value” workers with characteristic
θL, the eﬀective wage per unit of eﬃcient labor is w
1−(1−z)(1−p)δ
z+(1−z)p which is a decreasing
function of z. Hence, that group will get positive employment if and only if its proportion
of ”hard working” individuals is below the proportion of ”high working values” workers
of in the other group. The labor demand L in that case will be an increasing function of
the other complementary factor of production KG and a negative function of the wage
rate w.
The impact of z ∈ {q,Q} on L is a priori ambiguous as an increase in z increases
the expected number of eﬃcient units of labor provided by workers of the group, but at
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the same time reduces the eﬀective real cost of these workers w 1−(1−z)(1−p)δz+(1−z)p . We make
however the following assumption ensuring that the latter eﬀect is stronger than the
former :
Assumption 2: (x) = x
Ψ0(x)
Ψ(x)
>
1
1− δ
Thus
∂L(KG, w, z)
∂z
> 0
that is the wage elasticity of labor demand is large enough to make sure that more
workers get employed when the group is known to have a larger proportion of ”hard
working” individuals. Further, we assume that there is always unemployment for the
minority group in the ”primary” labor market, that is:
Assumption 3: L(KG, w, 1) = KGΨ [w] < 1
2.2 Functioning of the ”ethnic labor market”
In constrast to the primary labor market, we assume that the ethnic labor market func-
tions under competitive conditions with no asymmetry of information and no moral
hazard between ethnic entrepreneurs and their fellow workers. Production is obtained
by a standard constant return to scale neoclassical production function G(KE, L) where
KE is the stock of ethnic entrepreneurship. Labor demand Le writes as GL(KE, Le) = we
where we is the wage prevailing in that ethnic market.
The structure of labor market participation is then the following. We suppose that
the wage rate w in the primary labor market is large enough that ethnic workers first
prefer to find a job in that market rather than in their own ”ethnic” pool. If they are
not successful in the primary labor market, they turn next to the ”ethnic labor market”
and eventually get a job within their own community. For a θL worker, the participation
condition to the primary labor market writes therefore as:
mG [w − θL] + (1−mG)mLe [we − θL] ≥ mLe [we − θL]
or:
w ≥ we (3)
wheremG is the probability for a worker to be employed in the primary labor market and
mLe is the probability to be employed in the ethnic market. Similarly, for a θH worker,
the participation condition to the primary labor market writes as:
mG [p+ (1− p)(1− δ)]w + (1−mG)mHe [we − θH ] ≥ mHe [we − θH ]
or:
[p+ (1− p)(1− δ)]w ≥ we − θH (4)
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• Employment probabilities and equilibrium wages :
In the primary labor market the wage rate is w and the probabilities of employment
of a worker from the ethnic group are simply:
q < Q mG = 0
q > Q mG = L(KG, w, q)
q = Q mG ∈ [0, L(KG, w, q)]
In the sequel, except when specified, we will omit the dependence on KG and w and
note L1(q) = L(KG, w, q)). We also assume that jobs are distributed uniformely between
workers of type θL and θH in that ”general” market so that a residual fraction q(1−mG)
(resp. (1 − q)(1 − mG)) of workers of type θL (resp. θH) remains to be potentially
employed in their own ”ethnic” labor market. Denote Le(KE, w) the competitive labor
demand function (ie. such that GL(KE, Le) = w) in the ”ethnic ”labor market and pose
LL = Le(1, θL) and LH = Le(1, θH).
It is then easy to characterize the competitive equilibrium in the ethnic labor market.
This is shown in figures (1), (2) and (3). The ethnic labor demand curve Le(KE, w) is
decreasing in the wage rate in the ”ethnic labor market”.The supply curve SS is the
residual labor supply curve of workers without jobs in the ”general” labor market. It is
an increasing step function, reflecting simply the participation constraint of the workers”
(ie. w ≥ θi for i ∈ {L,H}). For w < θL, no worker wants to participate in the market.
For θL ≤ w < θH only the residual number q(1−mG) of ”high working values” workers
are ready to supply labor. Finally for w ≥ θH all residual agents are ready to work.
We assume that the stock of ethnic entrepreneurial capital is not too large and such
that there is always unemployment in the ethnic labor market.
Assumption 4: KE <
1− L(KG, w, 1)
LH
=
1− L1(1)
LH
Under that condition GL(KE, 1− L1(q)) ≤ θH and therefore KE < 1−L1(q)LH for all values
of q.We will consider situations in which there is unemployment in the ethnic group (ie.
such that GL(KE, 1) ≤ θH) that is the stock of ethnic entrepreneurship cannot absorb
all the labor force of the ethnic group. As well this means that the equilibrium wage in
the ethnic labor market is such that we ≤ θH .
¿From this and (3) and (4), a suﬃcient condition to have all ethnic workers willing
to participate first in the ”primary” labor market is :
Assumption 5: w ≥ θH
The ”ethnic” labor market equilibrium can then be depicted along three possible sit-
uations, depending on where the ”ethnic” labor demand curve Le(KE, w) crosses the
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residual ”ethnic” supply labor curve SS. These cases are represented in figures (1), (2)
and (3).
[figures 1, 2, and 3 about here]
Formally, depending on the value of the stock of entrepreneurial capital KE,the labor
market equilibrium is described by the following conditions:
1) If KE < q(1−mG)/LL, then:
we = θL ; mLe =
KELL
q(1−mG)
and mHe = 0
2) If q(1−mG)/LL ≤ KE < q(1−mG)/LH , then:
we = GL(KE, q(1−mG)) ; mLe = 1 and mHe = 0
3) If q(1−mG)/LH ≤ KE < (1−mG)/LH , then:
we = θH ; mLe = 1 and m
H
e =
KELH − q(1−mG)
(1− q) (1−mG)
Given that the probabilities to be employed for the two types of workers write as :
mL = mG + (1−mG)mLe and mH = mG + (1−mG)mHe
The previous discussion can be summarized by:
a) Low proportion of ”high work value” workers (ie. q < Q):
if KE <
q
LL
; mL =
KELL
q
and mH = 0 (5)
if
q
LL
≤ KE <
q
LH
; mLe = 1 and m
H = 0
if
q
LH
≤ KE ; mLe = 1 and mH =
KELH − q
1− q
b) High proportion of ”high work values” workers (ie. q > Q):
- if KE <
q(1− L1(q))
LL
; mL = L1(q) +
KELL
q
and mH = L1(q) (6)
- if
q(1− L1(q))
LL
≤ KE <
q(1− L1(q))
LH
; mL = 1 and mH = L1(q)
if
q(1− L1(q))
LH
≤ KE ; mL = 1 and mH = L1(q) +
KELH − q(1− L1(q))
1− q
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c) Intermediate proportion of ”high work value” workers (ie. q = Q and any value
mG ∈ [0, L1(q)]):
- if KE <
q(1−mG)
LL
; mL = mG +
KELL
q
and mH = mG (7)
- if
q(1−mG)
LL
≤ KE <
q(1−mG)
LH
; mL = 1 and mH = mG
if
q(1−mG)
LH
≤ KE ; mL = 1 and mH = mG +
KELH − q(1−mG)
1− q
2.3 Employment and cultural evolution of work values
• Cultural Evolution of work values within the ethnic community
We wish to investigate the relationship between work status and diﬀerential work
values across ethnic communities. Hence we need to endogenize the dynamics of ”work
values” within and across communities. To simplify matters, we will assume that the
state of ”work values” inside the ” majority” group is exogenously given by Q and
invariant overtime. This allows us to concentrate our analysis on the cultural evolution
of the minority group. With respect to that group, we will follow recent work the
economic literature on cultural transmission (Boyd and Richerson (1985), Cavalli Sforza
(1981), Bisin and Verdier (2000), (2001), (2004), Saez-Marti and Zenou (2005)) and
assume that work values are culturally transmitted within the community according to
an intergenerational transmission process. Consider then that the community population
is stationary, with one child per parent. This size is therafter normalized to 1. A parent
with an individual characteristic θi with i ∈ {L,H} will transmit his trait θi to his
child with some probability P (θi | θi). The crucial assumption that we make here is the
fact that this probability depends on his employment status E for employed or UN for
unemployed. More precisely, we assume the following:
P (θL | θL, E) = 1− P (θH | θL, E) = 1
P (θL | θH , E) = 1− P (θH | θH , E) = γ
P (θL | θL, UN) = 1− P (θH | θL, UN) = 1− β
P (θL | θH , UN) = 1− P (θH | θH , UN) = 0
with β, γ < 1.This formulation captures the fact that the employment status of the
parent aﬀects positively the probability of transmitting the ”high work values” trait
while conversely, the unemployment status of the parent is more likely to transmit the
”low work values” cultural trait to the child. Under such probabilities, we can easily
11
summarize the process of cultural evolution through the following transition matrices in
which the first row reflects the stage of preferences at the current generation and the
first column the stage of preferences in the next generation :
E θL θH
θL 1 γ
θH 0 1− γ
and
UN θL θH
θL 1− β 0
θH β 1
Using this, the dynamics of cultural evolution of the system write as
qt+1 = qtmLt + qt(1−mLt )(1− β) + (1− qt)mHt γ
According to that equation, the total number qt+1 of ”high work values” individuals
inside the community in period t+ 1 is the sum of three diﬀerent terms. The first term
qtmLt reflects individuals with ”high work values” parents employed in the primary labor
market or the ethnic labor market and who transmit their trait θL with probability 1.
The second term qt(1−mLt )(1− β) reflects individuals with ”high work values” parents
who are unemployed during the period and transmit their trait θL with probability 1−β.
The third term (1− qt)mHt γ shows individuals with ”low work values” parents who are
employed and who transmit their trait θH with probability γ.
This equation can be rearranged as :
qt+1 − qt = − β qt(1−mLt ) + (1− qt)mHt γ
with mLt and m
H
t satisfying (5), (6) and (7).
3 Solution of the Model
We are now in a position to solve the dynamics of the model and determine the long run
state of ”work values” inside the minority group.
1) Consider first the case qt < Q :, using (5, we get:
qt+1 − qt = − β qt(1−mLt ) + (1− qt)mHt γ
with
if KE <
qt
LL
; mLt =
KELL
qt
and mH = 0
if
qt
LL
≤ KE <
qt
LH
; mLt = 1 and m
H
t = 0
if
qt
LH
≤ KE ; mLt = 1 and mHt =
KELH − qt
1− qt
It is easy to see that three possible regimes can appear in such a case:
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• Proposition 1: i) If KE ≤ Q/LL, then all points q ∈ [KELH ,KELL] are steady
states. ii) If Q/LL < KE ≤ Q/LH , then all points q ∈ [KELH , Q[ are steady
states. iii) If Q/LH < KE, then qt+1 − qt > 0 for all qt ∈ [0, Q] and there is no
steady state in that region.
Proof: See the appendix
2) Consider now qt ≥ Q :using (6), we get:
qt+1 − qt = − β qt(1−mLt ) + (1− qt)mHt γ
It is useful to pose the following functions:
KL(q) =
q(1− L1(q))
LL
, KH(q) =
q(1− L1(q))
LH
and fKL(q) = q(1− L1(q))LL − γβ L1(q)(1− q)LL
Then using (6) we get immediately:
- if KE ≤ KL(qt) ; qt+1 − qt = βLL
³
KE − fKL(qt)´ (8)
- if KL(qt) < KE < KH(qt) ; qt+1 − qt = (1− qt)L1(qt)γ > 0
if KH(qt) ≤ KE ; qt+1 − qt = (1− qt)γL1(qt) + γLH
h
KE −KH(qt)
i
> 0
For expositional simplicity, we assume that KL(q), KL(q) and fKL(q) are increasing
functions of q (see a suﬃcient condition in the appendix for this to be ensured). Then
we get the following immediate result:
• Proposition 2: i) If KE ≤ fKL(Q), then or all values of qt+1−qt < 0 for all qt > Q
and there is no steady state in that region. ii) If fKL(Q) < KE ≤ fKL(1), then there
is a unique steady state q∗ ∈]Q, 1[ given by fKL(q∗) = KE. iii) If fKL(1) < KE, then
qt+1 − qt > 0 for all qt > Q and the unique steady state is q∗ = 1.
Proof: See the appendix
Finally we can discuss briefly the limit case where qt = Q at some date. A steady state
at this point q = Q can only exist when the (endogenous) probability of employment in
the primary labor market mG is such that qt+1 − qt = 0 at qt = Q. Given (7), this can
only be the case when mLt < 1.For mG ∈ [0, L1(Q)] this occurs only when we have
KE <
Q(1−mG)
LL
; mL = mG +
KELL
Q
and mH = mG
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In such a case the dynamics are given by
qt+1 − qt = βLL
³
KE − fK(Q,mG)´
with fK(Q,mG) = Q(1−mG)LL − γβ mG(1−Q)LL
and fK(Q,mG) ∈ [ QLL , fKL(Q)] for mG ∈ [0, L1(Q)]
It follows immediately the following conclusion
• Proposition 3: i) If KE ≤ fKL(Q), then qt+1 − qt < 0 at qt = Q. ii) If fKL(Q) <
KE ≤ Q/LL, then q∗ = Q is a steady state for some value m∗G ∈ [0, L1(Q)] such
that fK(Q,m∗G) = KE. iii) If Q/LL < KE, then qt+1 − qt > 0 for qt = Q.
It follows that only in the intermediate interval fKL(Q) < KE ≤ Q/LL is the point
q = Q a steady state. Moreover given the dynamics described in proposition 1 for the
region qt < Q and in proposition 2 for the region qt > Q, this steady state is unstable.
• Discussion
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are illustrated in figure (4),.representing the dynamics of
work values in the plane (q,KE) as a function of the level of entrepreneurial capital KE
in the community.
[Figure 4 about here]
It is easy to see that when the level of entrepreneurial capital is less than some
maximum value KE = Q/LH , there is always the possibility of steady states in the
region.q < Q, in which ethnic workers have no access to the general labor market and
are confined to find employment in their ethnic labor market. Indeed, in the hatched
region in figure (4) (delimited by the two lines KE = q/LL and KE = q/LH and the
vertical line q = Q), for a given value of KE, there are multiple steady states (the whole
set of points q ∈ [KELH , Min {KELL;Q}[ . These steady state are reached when the
initial conditions for ”work values” are low (ie.q = q0 < Q)
These low steady states can be as well reached when initial values of q = q0 are
larger than Q but when the stock of entrepreneurial capital is very low (ie. less thanfKL(Q)). In such a situation depicted by point A, workers initially have access to the
primary labor market. However, because too many of them cannot find a job either in
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the general labor market or the ethnic labor market (because of the low stock of ethnic
capital), the role models of ”high work values” is not well culturally transmitted over
generations and there cannot be a long run cultural steady state in this region. ”High
work values” tend on average to disappear in the group, making its members less and
less attractive to jobs in the primary labor market. In the end, the cultural equilibrium
is obtained in the region q < Q with exclusion of the primary labor market.
If ,on the other hand the stock of entrepreneurial capital is larger than the thresholdfKL(Q), there exists for all initial value q0 > Q a long run cultural equilibrium q∗ in
the region q > Q. This cultural equilibrium is clearly positively related to the stock of
entrepreneurial capital in the ethnic group (ie. q∗ is increasing in KE) and can eventually
correspond to the group fully adhering to ”high work values” (ie. q∗ = 1).
It is interesting to see that in this region, an increase in the ethnic entrepreneurial
capital KE has two eﬀects on employment of workers from that group . More precisely in
such a regime ethnic employment is simply given by LLKE while primary labor market
employment is L1(q∗). Hence total employment writes as :L = LLKE + L1(q∗). Ceteris
paribus, an increase dKE in KE has therefore the direct eﬀect of increasing employment
in the ethnic labor market by LLdKE. Given this, it has as well the indirect eﬀect of
increasing the proportion of working role models in the community, promoting therefore
”hard work” values in the group. This in turn tends to favor integration in the primary
labor market. by dL1dq∗
dq∗
dKE
The full impact of an increase in the stock of ethnic entre-
preneurial capital is therefore larger than its direct impact inside the community.as it
generates a positive reputational externality on other ethnic workers hat can be poten-
tially employed in the primary labor market.
3.1 Comparative statics
Two interesting comparative statics can be undertaken in this simple model.
Minimum wage w and labor market frictions
First we can see how primary labor market frictions like minimum wage legislations
can aﬀect in the long run labor market integration and in the long run the dynamics of
” work values”. Consider for instance that the wage w in the general labor market is
fixed by a minimum wage legislation.. An increase in w has the following eﬀect on the
dynamics of work values of the community. It tends to reduce the general employment
level L1(q), whenever there is access to that market. The implications for the dynamics
of ”work values” is immediate. In figure (5), the curve KE = fKL(q) is shifted up. For
a given value of entrepreneurial capital KE, this tends to reduce long run equilibrium
”hard working” values and the capacity of the ethnic group to integrate in the labor
market. in two ways. It tends to reduce the value of the cultural equilibrium.q∗ in the
region q > Q while it has obviously no eﬀect on the range of possible steady states
[q∗H , q
∗
L] in the region with no access to the ”general labor market” (ie. the region with
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q < Q).
[figure 5 about here]
The intuition is clear. An increase in the cost of labor in the primary labor market
makes firms less willing to hire workers. This in turn leads to less role models of working
individuals in the group, reducing therefore the dissimination of ” hard work” values. As
is clear, beyond the direct impact of the labor market friction on unemployment, one has
as well in the long run a further indrect negative impact on labor market participation
because of the change of ”work values” in the group as anticipated by employers in the
general labor market. Further the preceding discussion reveals that the impact of labor
market institutions goes beyond our simple example of a miminum wage. Indeed any
labor market frictions that makes it more diﬃcult for ethnic workers to penetrate the
gerenal labor market, will have the same consequences on the dynamics of ”work values”
in the group and therefore on its capacity to integrate the economy in general.
Finally notice that across ethnic groups, those which are better endowed in ethnic
entrepreneurial capital, are also less likely to be aﬀected by such frictions. Indeed a
group with a level of entrepreneurial capital as described by point B in picture (6), is
likely to be much more aﬀected than a community with a level presented by point C.
While for the better endowed group an increase in w leads simply to a reduction of ”
work values” from qC to q0C , for the poorly endowed community, we may get a dramatic
shift from a regime with qB > Q to a regime with q0B < Q with no more participation in
the primary labor market.
[figure 6 about here]
Change in KG and in general labor market conditions
It is quite obvious to see from (1) and (2) that a change in the resource stock KG is
aﬀecting the access to the primary labor market in the opposite direction to a change in
w . An increase in KG increases employment level L1(q). This in turn promotes ”work
values” to disseminate in the group, generating further integration in the labor market.
This suggests that persistent macroeconomic conditions may well aﬀect positively (in case
of expansion) or negatively (in case of contractions) ”work values” in a given social group.
Similar to our previous discussion of changes in labor market institutions, it is clear that
in terms of the cultural dynamics of their ”work” values,.groups which are better endowed
with entrepreneurial capital, are also more likely to benefit from expansionary phases
and are also better sheltered from the negative side of contractionary phases.
Indeed for poorly endowed communities, we may even get some hysteresis eﬀect for
the evolution of their ”work” values. Take for instance the situation described in figure 6
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and a community endowed with little entrepreneurial capital KE and located at a steady
state A.with general labor market participation. Then a persistent negative shock onKG
can bring the community to a long run situation like point B with its workers confined to
the ethnic labor arket. If, after setting in this new equilibrium, KG returns to its initial
value, the community will not settle back to the initial situation, As a matter of fact, it
will settle in an equilibrium like C where its members are still excluded from the primary
labor market. This discussion suggests that persistent (but not permanent) changes in
the economic environment may still have permanent eﬀects on social values of groups,
especially for those which do not benefit from an active intra-group labor market.
4 Endogenous entrepreneurial capital
So far we treated the level of ethnic entrepreneurial capital as exogenous. In reality,
this variable is likely to be itself endogenous to the pattern of cultural values devoted to
work in the community. Indeed, one may expect that it is more profitable to invest in
a market with a high proportion of ”hard working” workers than in a market where the
average population is naturally less inclined to make eﬀorts on the job. If that happens,
then certainly our variable KE will depend on q. In order to see that in the simplest
way let us consider that in each period there is a capital market on which ethnic firms
can raise and invest capital for production inside their community.at a capital cost r
One may then compute the rE return of such an investment, depending on the ”pool”
of workers they have access to in their community. As usual two cases can be discussed
depending on the participation of ethnic workers into the primary labor market.
1) Low ”work values” in the community (ie. q < Q). We have then the following:
- if KE < q/LL, we have we = θL , ethnic employment is KELL and the return of
”ethnic entrepreneurial capital is given by:
rE =
G(KE, KELL)− θLKELL
KE
= G(1, LL)− θLLL = rL
- if q/LL ≤ KE < q/LH , then we = GL(KE, q), employment is q and:
rE =
G(KE, q)−GL(KE, q)q
KE
= G(1,
q
KE
)−GL(1,
q
KE
)
q
KE
= r(
q
KE
)
with r(.) an increasing function.such that r(LL) = rL
- if q/LH ≤ KE, then we = θH , ethnic employment is KELH and:
rE =
G(KE,KELH)− θHKELH
KE
= G(1, LL)− θHLL = rH
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notice as well that r(LH) = rH
The ethnic capital return function is plotted in figure (7). In order to focus on the
case with an interior solution for the stock of capital KE which is also compatible with
ethnic unemployment, we assume:
Assumption 6: r ∈]rL, rH [
Then the ethnic entrepreneurial capital level is given by r(q/KE) = r or noting
1
r−1(r) = λ(r)
KE = KE(q) = λ(r)q
with λ(r) a decreasing function of r. Moreover given assumption 6, we know that q/LL ≤
K∗E(q) < q/LH
2) High ”work values” in the community (ie.q > Q). Then we get the following:
- If KE ≤ KL(q) then we = θL, ethnic employment is KELL and rE = rL
- If KL(q) < KE < KH(q) then we = GL(KE, q(1 − L1(q)), ethnic employment is
q(1− L1(q)) and
rE = r
"
q(1− L1(q))
KE
#
- If KH(q) < KE then we = θH , ethnic employment is KELH and rE = rH
Again it is worth noting that at the levelKL(q) (respectivelyKH(q)), we have rE = rL
(respectively rE = rH). It follows that the entrepreneurial capital level is given by :
KE = KE(q) = λ(r)q(1− L1(q))
Moreover given our assumption 6, we know that for that KL(q) < KE(q) < KH(q)
[Figure 7 about here]
¿From the previous discussion, figure (4) is modified as shown in figure (7). Indeed
for the region q < Q there is now a new line KE = λ(r)q that is in-between the two
rays q/LL and q/LH , showing the amount of entrepreneurial capital compatible with
a given cultural steady state q. In the region q > Q, there is as well the new curve
KE = λ(r)q(1−L1(q)) which is necessarily above KE = KL(q). This implies that in this
region the only steady state is q∗ = 1 with the whole social group adopting ”high work
values” This discussion is summarized in the following proposition:
• Proposition 4: Assume that assumption (6) holds, then we have:
i) If q0 < Q, then q0 is a cultural steady state and the level of entre-
preneurial capital is KE = λ(r)q0
ii) If q0 > Q, then the cultural steady state is q∗ = 1, associated in
the long run with a level of entrepreneurial capital KE = λ(r)(1− L1(1))
18
Proposition 4 illustrates in a extreme form the complementarity between the cultural
evolution of ”work values” and the pattern of investment in ethnic entrepreneurial cap-
ital. Assuming that ethnic entrepreneurs have free access to the capital market to make
their investment, we see from ii) that once ”work values” are suﬃciently disseminated
in the group (ie. q0 > Q), this stimulates investment in ethnic entrepreneurial capital.
This investment leads in turn to better labor market integration. Via the pattern of role
models it stimulates, this further promotes the diﬀusion of ”work values” in the group.
In this simple framework, the whole eﬀect of this process is complete assimilation of
the ”high working” values in the community and a high level of ethnic entrepreneurial
capital.
Obviously, if ethnic investors are constrained on the credit market, there is a ceiling
KE such that KE ≤ KE. When the ceiling is binding, the dynamics of ”work values” in
the group will evolve according to the model with an exogenous level of entrepreneurial
capital KE . If that level is less than fKL(1), then we get the same long run results
as in proposition 2 for initial conditions q0 > Q and the group can stay less than fully
socialized to ”hard work values” (ie. q∗ < 1)
5 Empirical evidence in the case of France
Long term unemployment, precarity and exclusion from the labour market constitute a
major issue in France. It has progressively become a widespread view that the French
labour market is a segmented one (ref: blanchard, cahuc?); moreover, the evidence seems
to be that the nationality and foreign origin of individuals is not neutral with respect to
their situation on this segmented market.
Quantitatively, the latest available census (1999) reports a population of 58,5 millions
inhabitants, of which 5,6 millions immigrants (i.e. people born in a foreign country with a
foreign nationality), including 1,67 millions immigrants fromMaghreb (Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia), and 1,79 millions immigrants from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal).
These two groups constitute the most important minorities in France; they account for
62% of foreign immigrants. However, these figures only account for immigrants of the
first generation. According to the survey that we use (Histoire de Vie, INSEE, 2003),
immigrants of the first and second generation represent up to 16.6% of the population,
count about 8% from Maghreb and 5% from Southern Europe.
In this section, we provide an illustration of the influence of entrepreneurship on
cultural work attitudes and labour market integration of these two main ethnic minorities
in France. We mainly hinge on a survey of the French population (“Histoire de vie”,
INSEE 2003), in which immigrants of the first and second generations were deliberately
over-represented, and which contains a series of subjective attitudinal questions regarding
work values.
We first some present descriptive statistics documenting the specificity of the pro-
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fessional integration of North African versus Southern European immigrants, insisting
on their sector specialisation and their social network. We then propose an econometric
test of the role of the social “entrepreneurial” network of immigrants. Matching the
“Histoire de vie” survey with the French population census of 1999, we device an identi-
fication strategy based on the regional variability of the entrepreneurial social capital of
ethnic minorities in France. We first observe that the work values of the North African
immigrants are significantly diﬀerent from those of other segments of the population;
however, we show that this specificity is statistically totally explained by the entrepre-
neurial network of this group. These findings are consistent with a model of cultural
transmission of work values through the density of entrepreneurial capital available to
the members of each group of immigrants.
5.1 Data
This section mainly hinges on a survey of the French population, Histoire de vie -
construction des identite´s , conducted in 2003 by the national statistical oﬃce (INSEE)
with many other institutional partners. The sample of the survey includes 8 403 adults
living in France (metropolitan), with a deliberate over-representation of the foreign and
immigrated population. About half of the sampled population was professionally active
in 2003 (4 387 persons).
The survey contains both objective and subjective information about individuals’
trajectories since their birth. After a general, broad-ranging questioning, respondents
were asked about their attitude towards work. The first question deals with the place
of work in the identity of respondents: “Among the topics that we have been talking
about, which are the three items that most fit with you, that best describe who you are?
(job, family, leisure, origins, language, etc.)”. Professionally active respondents were also
asked to evaluate the relative importance of work in their life, compared to other aspects
of their life: “nowadays, would you say that in your life in general your job; 1. is more
important than all the rest; 2. is very important but at pair with other things (family,
personal life, social life, etc.); 3. is important but less than other things; 4. is not very
important”. Finally, professionally active respondents were asked whether, in their job,
satisfaction motives outweigh dissatisfaction motives. (See the Annex for the complete
wording of these questions).
In spite of the specific composition of the sample, foreign respondents are not numer-
ous enough to allow for a distinction amongst the diﬀerent generations of immigrants.
We thus define a broad notion of ”origin” based on the information available for the
respondents and their parents (two generations) concerning their country of birth and
nationality at birth. Firstly, we define a category of people ”of North African origin”,
which includes all individuals whose nationality at birth, or that of at least one of their
parents, was either Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian, or whose birth place, or that of
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at least one of their parents, is located in this region. We also use the mother tongue
declared by the respondents as a double check (Tribalat 2004). We proceed in the same
way for the definition of the group of people with a ”Southern European origin” (Italy,
Spain and Portugal). Thirdly, we isolate native French people who were born French
and whose two parents were born in France with a French nationality— admittedly a very
restrictive definition. The last group is the residual (immigrant of the first or second
generation, not coming from Southern Europe or Maghreb).
Because we are interested in the professional integration of these groups, we only
retain the sub-sample of males, aged from 18 to 60 years old. This is needed to avoid
the specific situation of senior people on the French labour market (Hairault et al., 2006,
2007), as well as the influence of diﬀerent cultural attitudes regarding children care and
female participation in the labour market (Fernandez and Fogli 2007, Guiso and al.,
2006).
This grouping reveals important diﬀerences, both objective and subjective, in terms
of integration into the labour market.
5.2 Work Attitudes and Discrimination on the French Labour
Market
Simple descriptive statistics (Table 1) suggest that immigrants from North Africa attach
less importance to their job than other segments of the population; they consider their
job as a more minor motive of identity and are less satisfied with it. By contrast, people
coming from Southern Europe are closer, in their declared attitudes, to the native French
and declare more frequently that working is at least as important as other aspects of life
(column 4, table 1). As shown by Table 2, this diﬀerence holds even when one controls
for the classical socio-demographic circumstances.
[Table 1] about here
Of course, the subjective work attitudes of people of North African origin is related
to their objective working conditions: they are more often unemployed, less often on a
permanent contract, and suﬀer generally from less stability in their working conditions.
An important literature has illustrated racial discrimination on the American labour
market (see Altonj et Blanck, 1999, Neal et Johnson, 1996). In France, the common
knowledge is that immigrants suﬀer from a more diﬃcult access to employment rather
than from lower wages (Joseph and Lemie`re, 2005). However, beyond this observation,
surveys have also documented the existence of an important heterogeneity among immi-
grants: people of North African origin are more often unemployed and experience a more
discontinuous career, in sharp contrast with the situation of workers of South European
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origin (Dayan et al., 1996 ; Dos Santos, 2005; Maurin, 1991 ; Meurs et al., 1999 ;Okba
and Laine´, 2004 ; Tribalat, 2004, 2005; Silberman and Fournier, 2007).
The nationally representative survey Histoire de Vie confirms these observations.
Among male respondents aged 18 to 60 years old, immigrants from North Africa are twice
as often unemployed (14%) as other workers; their rate of activity (59%) is 20 points
lower than the national average (Table 2). The proportion of workers of Maghrebian
origin that hold a permanent contract (77%) is ten points lower than the average. They
more often than others occupy low skill jobs (Table 3). Eventually, their labour income
is lower: about half of them have an income below the median income, as opposed to
31% of the average active men aged 18 to 60 years in the general population. All these
observations hold in a regression with controls for the productive and socio-demographic
circumstances of individuals (Table 4).
[Table 2, 3, 4 about here]
Stylized facts established by the literature complete this picture (Caille, 2005; Dos
Santos, 2005; Laine´ and Okba, 2004, 2005; Joseph and Lemie`re, 2005; Meurs et al.
forthcoming; Silberman and Fournier, 2006, 2007; Tribalat, 2004, 2005). In terms of ed-
ucation, students of North African origin often choose general instead of professional ed-
ucation tracks, as opposed to the more technical and professional tracks chosen by South
European students. Moreover, the education fields chosen by the young Portuguese, for
instance, are consistent with the job opportunities oﬀered by employers of the same ori-
gin, namely a network of small and medium size firms concentrated in a few industrial
sectors such as house-building and public construction, or qualified manual occupations
in the sectors of electricity, electronics, graphic industries and automobile reparation,
which can be thought of as a sort of ”ethnic labour market”. By contrast, young workers
of Maghrebian origin cannot rely on the same type of integration network. Their fathers
are more often unqualified workers employed in restructuring sectors or unemployed,
hence unable to give them access to employment. They are more often concentrated
in larger and public firms where they have less control over the hiring process. There
are also fewer independent workers among the immigrants from Maghreb. Young peo-
ple of North African origin more often occupy jobs in the service sector, especially low
qualification jobs (cleaning, care-taking, security guards, transportation), or jobs in the
public and social sector (public hospitals, public housing, local municipalities); they also
occupy low-skill blue-collar jobs (handling process, machine-building).
The survey “Histoire de Vie” also contains questions relating to the social life of
respondents. It shows that respondents of North African origin less often meet their
colleagues outside work (27% of them do, as compared to 36% in average). Among
their friends, the ratio of people exerting the same profession (26%) is much lower than
the average (37%); whereas they more often make friends with people with the same
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geographical origin (36% versus 30% in average). They also participate less in profes-
sional organisations (4% versus 10% for French and 7% for other immigrants). Hence,
the professional component of the social capital of the first and second generations of
immigrants from North Africa seems to be particularly weak.
Concerning the transmission of work attitudes, the survey “Histoire de vie” reveals
that 8% of respondents of North African origin declare that they have not seen their
father work (because he was absent, retired or unemployed) when they were aged 15 years
old, against 4% in average. De facto, controlling for the usual observable characteristics
(age, matrimonial status, number of children, education, region), the fact of having
an absent or unemployed father (hence no working model) significantly increases the
probability of being inactive for men aged 18 to 60 years (see infra).
In a nutshell, the picture that is suggested by the literature and that seems to be
supported by the survey “Histoire de vie” is the following: Immigrants from Maghreb,
employed in large industrial firms, mostly in unqualified occupations, were particularly
exposed to the shock of recession and industrial restructuring in the 1970’s; moreover
they lacked the network of social relations that could have allowed them to escape unem-
ployment and inactivity. The subsequent generations have not benefited from a network
of ”ethnic” firms that could naturally integrate them. This contrasts with the situation
of immigrants from Southern Europe, who were protected fro long term unemployment
thanks to a network of entrepreneurs concentrated in a few sectors. A study by Dos San-
tos (2005) reveals that about 60% of Portuguese workers declare that they have found
their job using personal relations or thanks to persons of the same origin; this diﬀerence
persists even in a regression with the usual controls.
These stylized facts are consistent with a model of inter-generational transmission
of work attitudes, where social capital plays both a direct role in the access to job and
an indirect role in the transmission of work values. Moreover, this dynamics can be
self-reinforcing as it becomes common knowledge and is integrated in the expectations
of employers.
5.3 The role of entrepreneurial network in the transmission of
work values and access to employment
We now propose a more rigourous test of the role of the entrepreneurial network on the
transmission of work values in France. Our identification strategy relies on the regional
variability of the density of ethnic networks. To this end, we match the survey “Histoire
de vie” with the 1999 French census, which contains the number employers of each geo-
graphical origin for each of the 22 French regions (surveyed people self-declare their oc-
cupation amongst the following categories: inactive/employee/independent/employer).
Our objective is to put in evidence the influence of the regional density of employers of
a given origin on the probability of being active, and on the work values of the individuals
of the same origin. If I am a worker of North African origin, are my work values and my
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chance to be employed influenced by my ”ethnic” professional network?
Clearly, one cannot answer this question by running a simple regression of individual
work values on the national proportion of entrepreneurs in her ethnic group. Indeed, the
latter is collinear with the dummy variable representing the ethnic group itself, so that
in fine, this naive estimation would only capture the influence of one’s origin on her work
values, which would be circular. To overcome this problem, we use the French census
to compute the share of entrepreneurs of each ethnic group among the total number of
entrepreneurs of each region. Let Ejbe the number of employers in region j, and Ejk the
number of entrepreneurs of ethnic group k in region j; Eki is the vector containing the
ratio Ejk/E
j for each individual i living in region j and belonging in the ethnic group k.
We regress the work values of individual i living in region j and belonging in ethnic
group k on a dummy for her ethnic group and the ratio Ekj = E
j
k/E
j, controlling for her
other professional and socio-demographic controls Xi.
WorkV aluesi = a0 + a1ethnicgroupk + a2Eki+ a3Xi + ui (9)
where ui is the error term, k = native French, or immigrant from Maghreb, Southern
Europe or Else and j = 1, 22. Because Ekj is defined at the regional level, we calculate
robust standard errors by clustering at the regional level.
Thanks to the regional variance of the ratio Ekj, if the latter turns out to be sta-
tistically significant, it will not be the mere reflect of other characteristics of the ethnic
groups Ekj.
The main identifying assumption of equation (9) is that Ekj is uncorrelated with
the error term ui. This implies, in particular, that there has not been an allocation
of immigrant workers with higher work values to regions with a higher concentration
in ethnic entrepreneurs. The well-documented low regional mobility of workers on the
French labour market (e.g. Pumain and Courgeau, 1993, Gaymard, 2005) comforts
this assumption. However, one could suspect that immigrants from Maghreb, and in
particular entrepreneurs, have chosen to localise in regions that were less hostile to their
ethnic group. However, the share of self-declared discriminated persons is very weakly
correlated with the share of immigrants from Maghreb in the regional population. By
contrast, the coeﬃcient of correlation between the share of immigrants from North Africa
amongst the local employers and the average feeling of discrimination of this group is
high: 0,31. The presence of entrepreneurs thus does not seem to reflect the lesser hostility
of the local population.
The identification of equation (9) is also threatened by the risk that an omitted
variable could be correlated both with the number of employers of a given origin in the
region (in 1999) and the work values of workers of the same origin (in 2003). For example,
one could argue that the average regional wealth of the ethnic groups influences both the
number of employers in this group (because it takes money to be an entrepreneur) and the
work values of the group (through education, social relations, etc.). Although we cannot
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completely discard this alternative explanation, available studies on this issue show that
financial capital is not the only condition for becoming an entrepreneur; the family role
models are at least as important (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998, Laferrere, 2001). It
would thus be exaggerated to reduce the role of the ethnic network of entrepreneurs to
the capital generated by this activity.
Finally, an interpretation of the results in terms of reverse causation would imply
that the share of employers of North African origin in region j in 1999 is influenced
by the work values of the inhabitants of the region in 2003. Literally, this is obviously
farfetched; however, it is possible that work values were already diﬀerent in 1999 and have
influenced the regional allocation of entrepreneurial capital. However, we do not need
to exclude this interpretation which is compatible with the logic of the model, where in
the long run equilibrium, work values, ethnic entrepreneurial capital and labour market
integration are closely interdependent.
5.3.1 Results
We start by introducing dummies representing the geographical origin of respondents in
the regression of work attitudes (columns 1, 3, 5, 7 in Table 5). The dummy for North
African origin appears to exert a significantly negative impact on the work values of
respondents. Immigrants of this origin are more often dissatisfied with their job, less
often declare that work is an important aspect of their life, less often quote their job as
an major motive of identity and have a higher probability to be inactive.
[Table 5 about here]
We then introduce the ratio Ekj in the same regressions (columns 2, 4, 6, 8). Table
5 shows that this ratio completely neutralizes the influence of ethnic dummies. More
precisely, the dummy for North African origin, which is highly significant in the regression
of work values, loses all its explanatory power once the ratio Ekj is introduced. This
is true for job identity, for job dissatisfaction, and for the probability of being active.
Concerning the importance attached to one’s job, the eﬀect is even more spectacular as
the sign of the coeﬃcient is reversed after the introduction of this ratio! Hence, once
the eﬀect of the ethnic networks is taken into account, it appears that the importance of
work is greater for workers of North African origin than for French natives (the reference
category). For all the other variables, job as a motive of identity, job satisfaction or the
probability to be inactive, there is no significant diﬀerence left after the regional share
of ethnic entrepreneurs is taken into account.
As explained earlier, a well-known stylized fact of the French labour market is the
contrast between the situation of the minority of immigrants from North African and
the South European group. Table 4 confirms this prior. It shows that, before the
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introduction of the ratio Ekj, belonging to the group of South European immigrants
does not imply diﬀerent work attitudes as compared to the average French natives. The
coeﬃcients on the work values of this group are not significant. Hence, at first sight, the
work values of the male immigrants from Southern Europe are close to the French ones
(which constitute the category of reference). The only diﬀerence is the lower probability
of South European immigrants of being inactive. Then, introducing the ratio of ethnic
entrepreneurs kills the eﬀect of the ethnic dummy on the probability to be inactive, but
surprisingly has the opposite eﬀect of rendering the coeﬃcient significant and positive
as concerns certain work values: job satisfaction and the importance of work.
This set of results suggests that, conditional on the integration network available
to them, immigrants from Southern Europe are both more attached to work and more
satisfied with their job than the average native French workers. In the case of immigrants
from North Africa, once the eﬀect of their network of employers taken into account, it
appears that their work values and probability to be inactive are the same as those of
the French natives, with the exception of the higher importance that they attach to work
(as compared to other activities).
In summary, the work attitudes of the ethnic minorities in France seem to be, to a
large extent, determined by the availability of their ethnic network. However, beyond
this eﬀect, the importance of work (as compared to other aspects of life) proves to be
more important to these immigrants than to the French natives, a feature that was not
apparent in na¨ıve descriptive statistics. It is indeed noticeable that, contrarily to what
is suggested by the raw statistics of Table 1, once the influence of the social network
neutralized, it appears that the importance of work is more important for immigrants,
including North-African immigrants of the first and second generation, than for the
native French. This finding is consistent with the fact that immigration is most often
based on economic motives.
The last two regressions presented in table 4 investigate the determinants of labor
market integration. They include, as a control, a dummy variable representing whether
respondents declare that their father was absent or unemployed when they were aged 15.
This dummy has a significant impact on the probability to be inactive. Again, comparing
regressions 7 and 8, the North African dummy looses significance, after controling for
the ratio of employers of the same origin in the region6.
Overall these results suggest that work values, social networks and labour market
participation are highly correlated. More generally, rather than relations of causality,
the results should be taken as indicating correlations between the observed variables.
This is consistent with our theoretical model, which suggests that in the long run, those
6Note that the results of Table 6 are essentially unchanged when we drop this control from the
regressions. We also verified that the work values that are explained in Table 5 in columns 5 to 6, i.e.
the place of work in people’s identity are themselves important determinants of the probability to be
inactive (coeﬃcient on job identity -1.099 [0,123], logit regression, 2908 observations, Log likelihood=-
1052, Pseudo R2=0.24)
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variables are strongly interdependent. The main claim of the paper is not so much
about the causality running from entrepreneurship to work values, but rather about the
possibility that diﬀerent equilibria can occur, in which work values, entrepreneurship and
labour market integration are closely intertwined. This rules out the idea that cultural
factors constitute the ultimate explanation for the labour market situation of certain
minorities.
6 Conclusion
The data of this new French survey seem to comfort the interpretation of the French
labour market as a segmented market in which the geographical origin of workers matters.
A first na¨ıve look at the raw data sketches the particular situation of the minority of
North African origin. Immigrants from this region are particularly poorly integrated in
the labour market; they experience higher rates of unemployment and more instability;
they also seem to attach less importance to their job, to consider their job as a more
minor motive of identity and to be less satisfied with it. These stylized facts concerning
the objective working conditions and the subjective work values of immigrants from
Maghreb immediately point to two possible explanations: discrimination and cultural
factors.
This paper shows that the story is more complex. Once the social capital specific to
each group of immigrants is taken into account, the specificity of immigrants from North
Africa in terms of work values becomes statistically insignificant or may be actually
reversed. For instance, concerning the subjective statement that “work is important as
compared to other aspects of life”, it appears that immigrants, including the minority
from North Africa, attach more importance to work than French natives, once the eﬀect
of ”ethnic” social capital is controlled for.
These findings suggest that ethnic social capital plays an important role in shaping
people’s attitude towards work, and that entrepreneurial capital is a key element of social
capital. Labour market segmentation, entrepreneurship and work values are closely
intertwined and, under similar global economic conditions, may define various possible
long run stable equilibria across minority groups.
These eﬀects do not constitute a substitute explanation to ethnic discrimination;
rather they must be seen as complementary. Indeed, network eﬀects potentially re-
inforce (or reduce) the stigma attached to each minority, depending on its records in
terms of labour market integration. Hence, the policy recommendation that would be
consistent with the view supported by this paper is not to minimize the importance of
discrimination, but to suggest an additional entry for public policy. While it may be
diﬃcult to directly aﬀect work values at a given point in time, our analysis suggests
that policies promoting labor market integration and/or entrepreneurial investment in
discriminated minority groups, may in the long run have snowball eﬀects in terms of
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dynamics of socialization and evolution of work values of the younger generations of
these groups. This, in turn will facilitate further labor market participation and entre-
preneurship within these groups. Finally, by improving their socio-economic integration,
this may also contribute to the reduction of discrimination against these groups.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1: It is easy to see that
if qt ≤ KELH ; qt+1 − qt = (KELH − qt)γ > 0 (10)
if KELH < qt ≤ KELL; qt+1 − qt = 0
if KELL < qt ; qt+1 − qt = − β (qt −KELL) < 0
Hence
i) When KE ≤ Q/LL, for qt < Q, the dynamics are described by (10) and it follows
immediately that the set [KELH ,KELL] describes the set of stable steady states.
ii) When Q/LL < KE ≤ Q/LH , then for qt < Q, we necessarily have qt ≤ KELL and
the dynamics of the system writes as:
if qt ≤ KELH ; qt+1 − qt = (KELH − qt)γ > 0
if KELH < qt < Q; qt+1 − qt = 0
and the set [KELH , Q[ are steady states.
iii) Finally when Q/LH < KE, then for qt < Q, we necessarily have qt ≤ KELH and
the dynamics of the system writes as:
if qt ≤ KELH ; qt+1 − qt = (KELH − qt)γ > 0
Thus the result.qt+1 − qt > 0 for all qt ∈ [0, Q[ and there is no steady state in that
region. QED
Proof: of proposition 2:
i) If KE ≤ fKL(Q), then as fKL(q) is increasing in q, then KE < fKL(q) < KL(q) for
all qt > Q and qt+1 − qt = βLL
³
KE − fKL(q)´ < 0 for all qt > Q and there is no steady
state in that region.
ii) If fKL(Q) < KE ≤ fKL(1), then as fKL(q) is increasing in q, there is a unique
steady state q∗ ∈]Q, 1[ given by fKL(q∗) = KE.Hence for qt ≤ q∗, we haveKE−fKL(qt) > 0
. Thus if KE < KL(qt), qt+1 − qt = βLL
³
KE − fKL(qt)´ > 0. On the other hand if
KL(qt) ≤ KE, we also have from (8) qt+1 − qt > 0. Hence in all cases for qt ≤ q∗
qt+1 − qt > 0. Now for or qt ≥ q∗, we have KE − fKL(qt) ≤ 0 and as well KE ≤ fKL(q) <
KL(q). It follows from (8) that qt+1− qt = βLL
³
KE − fKL(q)´ ≤ 0. This the result that
q∗ is the unique steady state in the set ]Q, 1[.
iii) If fKL(1) < KE, then notice that fKL(1) = KL(1) and thus for all qt ≤ 1
KL(qt) ≤ KL(1) < KE and from (8) qt+1− qt > 0 and the unique steady state is q∗ = 1.
QED
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Table 1. The subjective importance of work 
% Job is cited among the three 
most important items  of 
identity 
Work is more
important 
Job satisfaction 
motives are 
predominant 
Job dissatisfaction
motives are 
predominant 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Native French 49 31 49 11 
North African origin 37 24 46 17 
South European origin 43 30 40 12 
% of respondents : - who quote work in the three most important elements of their identity (column 1), - for 
whom their job is at least as important as other things (column 2), - who declare that motives of job 
dissatisfaction outweigh motives of satisfaction (column 3), - who declare that motives of satisfaction dominate 
(column 4). 
Weighted statistics. 
Sample : male population aged 18-60 years (column 1),active male population (columns 2-4). 
Source : « Histoire de vie- Construction des identités», Insee 2003. 
 
Table 2. Employment status by origin (%) 
 Origin : France Maghreb Southern 
Europe 
Total
%  
Employed 79 59 85 77
Unemployed 6 14 2 7
Student 9 15 6 9
Retired 4 4 2 4
Other inactive 3 6 3 4
  
Total 100 100 100 100
Weighted statistics. 
Sample : male population aged 18-60 years.. 
Source : « Histoire de vie- Construction des identités», Insee 2003. 
 
Table 3. Occupation and Origin 
 Origin France Maghreb
Southern 
Europe Total
%  
Farmers 4 1 2 3
Independent 6 5 7 6
Higher white collar 16 11 10 16
Intermediate professions 22 20 19 21
Qualified Employees 7 4 4 7
Unqualified Employees 3 7 4 4
Qualified workers 23 20 37 24
Unqualified workers 10 19 12 10
Inactive 9 14 5 9
Total 100 100 100 100
Weighted statistics. 
Sample : male population aged 18-60 years.. 
Source : enquête « Histoire de vie- Construction des identités», Insee 2003. 
French classification of occupations (CSP).  
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Table 4. The Ethnic Segmentation of the French Labour Market 
Logit estimates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Poor Income Independent Inactive Unemployed Permanent job
 
Age -0.054*** 0.050*** 0.039*** 0.048*** -0.014** 0.071*** -0.019** 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] 
Children under 11 years -0.458*** 0.444*** -0,005 -0.980*** -0.801*** 1.095*** 0,08 
 [0.125] [0.085] [0.186] [0.127] [0.175] [0.163] [0.247] 
Couple -1.159*** 0.582*** 0,138 -0.413*** -0,055 0,009 0,091 
 [0.114] [0.088] [0.177] [0.152] [0.191] [0.175] [0.225] 
Education        
 
- Omitted : none        
 
- secondary -1.025*** 0.516*** -0,161 -0.574*** -0.329* 0.516*** -0,095 
 [0.124] [0.092] [0.195] [0.125] [0.176] [0.182] [0.232] 
- technical long -1.143*** 0.498*** 0.588** -0.543*** -0,248 0.486* -0,429 
 [0.182] [0.131] [0.252] [0.192] [0.247] [0.251] [0.353] 
- higher -1.627*** 0.917*** 0,253 -1.382*** -1.053*** 0.738*** -0.935*** 
 [0.146] [0.101] [0.203] [0.161] [0.218] [0.204] [0.294] 
Origin 
- Omitted: native  French with 
2 French  parents       
- Maghreb 0.805*** -0.437*** -0.726** 0.597*** 0.661*** -0.542*** 
 [0.139] [0.104] [0.290] [0.148] [0.181] [0.187] 
- Southern Europe -0,215 0,15 0,084 -0.672*** -0.700** 0,329 
 [0.176] [0.121] [0.228] [0.219] [0.337] [0.264] 
 - Other 0.413*** -0,116 -0,086 0.360** 0.427** -0,242 
 [0.133] [0.098] [0.207] [0.144] [0.187] [0.190] 
 
Observations 2908 2815 2342 2908 2908 2445 
Pseudo R2 0,17 0,17 0,03 0,12 0,06 0,16 
log likelihood -1459 -5533 -759 -1228 -808 -811 
Source : enquête « Histoire de vie- Construction des identités», Insee 2003. 
Sample: men,  aged 18-60 years old. 
Column 1: probability to earn less than the median income  (logit model), Column 2: linear regression of the 
log(individual income), Column 3 : probability to have the statut of independent (logit model), Column 4: 
probability to be inactive (logit model), Column 5:  probability to be unemployed (logit model), probability to 
have a permanent job (logit model). 
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Table 5 
Logit regressions of the probability to declare that job is important/ satisfying/ a motive of identity 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
 Job 
dissatisfaction 
Job 
dissatisfaction 
Job 
important 
Job 
important 
Job identity Job identity 
Age 0,005 0,005 0,008* 0,004 -0,008* -0,008* 
 [0,009] [0,009] [0,004] [0,005] [0,004] [0,004] 
Children under 11 -0,001 0,006 0,024 0,034 -0,096 -0,097 
 [0,190] [0,191] [0,135] [0,145] [0,132] [0,132] 
Couple -0,01 -0,004 -0,288** -0,274*** 0,278* 0,277* 
 [0,177] [0,179] [0,115] [0,106] [0,143] [0,143] 
Income category 
 
      
Omitted : under the median       
       
average -0,855*** -0,869*** -0,109 -0,086 0,715*** 0,717*** 
 [0,189] [0,202] [0,099] [0,090] [0,087] [0,085] 
Richest decile -0,888*** -0,926*** 0,335*** 0,425*** 1,412*** 1,419*** 
 [0,232] [0,236] [0,123] [0,117] [0,137] [0,135] 
Education        
Omitted : none       
       
- secondary 0,147 0,152 -0,273** -0,313** -0,004 -0,004 
 [0,189] [0,189] [0,125] [0,137] [0,113] [0,112] 
- technical long 0,235 0,255 -0,226 -0,346* -0,136 -0,14 
 [0,204] [0,204] [0,200] [0,192] [0,125] [0,124] 
- higher -0,106 -0,106 -0,416*** -0,484*** 0,266** 0,267** 
 [0,249] [0,248] [0,134] [0,141] [0,110] [0,110] 
Origin       
Omitted : French natives       
       
North Africa 0,569** -1,326* -0,373*** 1,083*** -0,300*** 0,082 
 [0,255] [0,795] [0,142] [0,410] [0,093] [0,297] 
Southern Europe -0,253 -2,127** -0,151 1,323*** 0,035 0,413 
 [0,247] [0,849] [0,214] [0,386] [0,163] [0,320] 
Other 0,153 -1,683** 0,085 1,580*** 0,042 0,41 
 [0,247] [0,806] [0,112] [0,381] [0,145] [0,296] 
Father absent or inactive -0,059 -0,049   -0,028 -0,278 -0,279 
 [0,423] [0,421]   [0,286] [0,249] [0,249] 
Ratio of ethnic    -0,021**   0,017***   0,004 
employers in region   [0,010]   [0,004]   [0,003] 
             
Constant -1,728*** 0,218 -0,610*** -2,038*** -0,579*** -0,971*** 
 [0,417] [0,943] [0,181] [0,444] [0,174] [0,353] 
Observations 2025 2025 2192 2025 2651 2651 
Pseudo R2 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,05 0,05 
log likelihood -690 -689 -1347 -1237 -1739 -1739 
       
 Sample: men,  aged 18-60 years old. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Robust 
significant standard errors in bracket, cluster (region),  
Columns 1 and 2: probability to declare that motives of job dissatisfaction dominant; - columns 3 and 4: 
probability to declare that job is at least as important as other aspects of life; - column 5 and 6: probability to 
quote work in the three most important elements of their identity. 
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Table 6  
Logit regressions of the probability to be inactive 
 1 2 
 Inactive Inactive 
Age 0,074*** 0,074*** 
 [0,006] [0,006] 
Children under 11 -0,387** -0,387** 
 [0,153] [0,152] 
Couple -0,571*** -0,571*** 
 [0,156] [0,157] 
Income category 
 
  
Omitted : under the median   
   
average -1,987*** -1,987*** 
 [0,159] [0,160] 
Richest decile -2,377*** -2,378*** 
 [0,286] [0,294] 
Education    
Omitted : none   
   
- secondary -0,174 -0,174 
 [0,171] [0,170] 
- technical long -0,072 -0,071 
 [0,165] [0,168] 
- higher -0,708*** -0,708*** 
 [0,258] [0,256] 
Origin   
Omitted : French natives   
   
North Africa 0,330** 0,269 
 [0,144] [0,963] 
Southern Europe -0,629* -0,689 
 [0,327] [1,041] 
Other 0,132 0,073 
 [0,233] [0,781] 
Father absent or inactive 0,607*** 0,607*** 
 [0,222] [0,221] 
Ratio of ethnic    -0,001 
employers in region   [0,010] 
     
Constant -2,837*** -2,774*** 
 [0,248] [0,868] 
Observations 2651 2651 
Pseudo R2 0,22 0,22 
log likelihood -952  
   
Sample: men,  aged 18-60 years old. 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.Robust 
significant standard errors in bracket, cluster (region),  
Columns 7 and 8: probability to be inactive. 
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Annex: data, constructed variables and descriptive statistics 
 
I. The French survey of the population in 1999. 
The French census of the population is realized by the national statistical office (INSEE). The 
whole population is surveyed, i.e. 58 million inhabitants. We have used the latest available 
1999 census. Because nationality and immigration are considered to be « sensitive » topics, 
we have had access to somewhat aggregated data: we have used the NAT3E table, which 
details the total number of individuals by nationality * region * professional occupation. The 
census only distinguishes immigrants of the first generation, i.e. persons who were born with 
a foreign nationality. We have retained four categories of population: individuals who were 
born French, those who were born with a North African nationality (Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia), those who were born with a south European nationality (Italy, Portugal, Spain) and 
the residual category of immigrants. 
Table A1. Composition of the French population in the 1999 census 
Region Born French Maghreb South Europe Other Total
  
ILE DE FRANCE 8906217 593322 533737 917860 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 1251961 27380 28947 33914 
PICARDIE 1746615 32958 31699 45833 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 1699395 28014 18206 34824 
CENTRE 2275545 45211 60247 58959 
BASSE NORMANDIE 1386097 7894 7088 21357 
BOURGOGNE 1494437 33113 47557 35300 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 3748693 95298 49208 102672 
LORRAINE 2068349 54825 92908 93941 
ALSACE 1529602 46748 44401 112981 
FRANCHE COMTE 1025590 30220 26663 34784 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 3142814 22154 16838 40978 
BRETAGNE 2850783 10262 10700 35433 
POITOU CHARENTES 1592380 9056 17156 21861 
AQUITAINE 2703250 42733 107197 55773 
MIDI PYRENEES 2332888 50262 110813 58733 
LIMOUSIN 676919 7493 13034 13346 
RHONE ALPES 5009511 201541 233080 201715 
AUVERGNE 1231187 15229 40126 22114 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 2038746 85913 114537 57161 
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D 
AZUR 3964700 213740 182401 145412 
CORSE 226530 18596 11183 3840 
Total  52 902 209 1 671 962 1 797 726 2 148 791 58 520 688
en % 90,4 2,9 3,1 3,7 100
Source : INSEE, French census of the population,  table NAT3E,  1999.  
First column : individuals who were born French, second column : people born with North African nationality 
(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), third column: people born with South European nationality (Italy, Spain, 
Portugal), fourth column: Other origin.. 
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Table A2. Structure of Regional Employers by Origin 
 % Native French  % immigrants 
from North Africa 
% immigrants from 
Southern Europe 
 among the employers of the region 
  
ILE DE FRANCE 78 5,9 6,1 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 95 0,7 2,2 
PICARDIE 94 1,0 2,3 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 96 0,9 1,4 
CENTRE 94 0,6 2,7 
BASSE NORMANDIE 97 0,3 0,6 
BOURGOGNE 94 0,6 3,0 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 95 1,2 1,7 
LORRAINE 90 0,9 4,2 
ALSACE 89 1,3 3,2 
FRANCHE COMTE 94 0,7 2,5 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 98 0,4 0,5 
BRETAGNE 98 0,3 0,6 
POITOU CHARENTES 97 0,3 1,0 
AQUITAINE 94 0,6 3,6 
MIDI PYRENEES 93 0,9 4,1 
LIMOUSIN 96 0,4 2,1 
RHONE ALPES 91 1,4 4,2 
AUVERGNE 95 0,5 3,3 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 91 1,6 4,7 
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D AZUR 90 2,5 3,9 
CORSE 92 1,6 5,1 
Source : INSEE,French census of the population,  table NAT3E,  1999.  
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Table A3. Structure of the population : 1. Native French 
 % inactive % employees % employers % employers and 
independent 
workers 
 among the total native French population of the region 
  
ILE DE FRANCE 56 40 1,9 3,7 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 61 34 2,2 4,4 
PICARDIE 61 35 1,8 3,6 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 61 35 1,8 3,5 
CENTRE 60 35 2,1 4,4 
BASSE NORMANDIE 61 33 2,2 5,0 
BOURGOGNE 61 33 2,2 4,8 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 65 32 1,4 2,8 
LORRAINE 61 35 1,7 3,2 
ALSACE 56 40 2,0 3,4 
FRANCHE COMTE 59 36 2,0 4,3 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 60 35 2,1 4,7 
BRETAGNE 61 33 2,3 5,2 
POITOU CHARENTES 62 32 2,4 5,4 
AQUITAINE 61 32 2,5 5,5 
MIDI PYRENEES 61 32 2,4 6,1 
LIMOUSIN 62 32 2,2 5,8 
RHONE ALPES 59 36 2,3 4,8 
AUVERGNE 61 32 2,2 5,9 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 66 29 2,4 5,5 
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D 
AZUR 
64 31 2,3 4,8 
CORSE 67 27 2,8 6,3 
Source : INSEE,French census of the population,  table NAT3E,  1999.  
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Table A3. continued.  Structure of the population 2. immigrants from North Africa 
 % inactive % employees % employers % employers and 
independent 
workers 
 among the total immigrants from North Africa in the region 
     
ILE DE FRANCE 61 34 2,1 4,6 
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 72 26 0,7 1,8 
PICARDIE 71 27 1,0 2,3 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 72 25 1,0 2,5 
CENTRE 71 27 0,7 1,8 
BASSE NORMANDIE 70 27 1,2 2,7 
BOURGOGNE 71 27 0,7 1,7 
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 78 20 0,7 2,1 
LORRAINE 73 25 0,7 1,4 
ALSACE 65 33 1,0 2,1 
FRANCHE COMTE 70 28 0,5 1,4 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 68 29 1,1 2,6 
BRETAGNE 65 31 1,9 4,2 
POITOU CHARENTES 69 28 1,4 3,0 
AQUITAINE 70 27 1,1 2,5 
MIDI PYRENEES 71 26 1,1 2,9 
LIMOUSIN 73 24 0,9 2,0 
RHONE ALPES 68 30 0,9 2,2 
AUVERGNE 71 26 1,0 2,4 
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 76 21 1,0 2,2 
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D AZUR 73 24 1,2 2,6 
CORSE 73 25 0,6 1,6 
Source : INSEE,French census of the population,  table NAT3E,  1999.  
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Table A3. continued.  Structure of the population 3. immigrants from Southern Europe (%) 
 % inactive % employees % employers % employers and 
independent workers
among the total immigrants from Southern Europe in the region
 
ILE DE France 45 50 2,4 4,6
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 52 44 2,2 3,8
PICARDIE 49 47 2,4 4,2
HAUTE NORMANDIE 52 44 2,4 3,9
CENTRE 47 48 2,3 4,0
BASSE NORMANDIE 58 37 2,7 4,7
BOURGOGNE 51 44 2,2 4,1
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 55 41 1,9 3,2
LORRAINE 60 37 1,7 2,9
ALSACE 46 50 2,5 3,9
FRANCHE COMTE 52 44 2,0 3,4
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 52 44 2,1 3,9
BRETAGNE 54 38 3,9 7,1
POITOU CHARENTES 55 40 2,4 4,6
AQUITAINE 60 35 2,4 5,0
MIDI PYRENEES 65 30 2,2 4,9
LIMOUSIN 51 43 2,5 5,3
RHONE ALPES 54 41 2,3 4,4
AUVERGNE 50 45 2,4 4,3
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 69 26 2,2 4,8
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D AZUR 70 25 2,1 4,4
CORSE 64 30 3,1 5,8
Source : INSEE,French census of the population,  table NAT3E,  1999.  
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II. The survey « Histoire de Vie » 
The survey « Histoire de vie » contains information about the nationality and the country of 
birth of the respondents, as well as those of their two parents. It also contains information 
about the three main mother tongues of the respondents. We have classified as immigrants of 
the first or second (or more) generation all respondents whose nationality, or parents’ 
nationality, or mother tongue, indicated a foreign origin. We have constructed four categories 
of people. Persons who were born French in France, with two French parents/ immigrants 
from North Africa/ immigrants from Southern Europe/Other. The structure of the sample of 
respondents aged from 18 to 60 years old, is as follows: 
 
Table A4. Composition of the population 18-60 years old (Histoire de Vie) 
 Whole population 18- 60 years   Men 18- 60 years 
 number % Weighted % number % Weighted %
   
French 4 215 65,9 75,94 1 928 66,3 76,8
Maghreb 724 11,3 8,2 341 11,7 7,7
Southern Europe 564 8,8 5,3 245 8,4 5,1
Other 891 13,9 10,57 394 13,6 10,4
   
 Total 6 394 100.00 100.00 2908 100.00 100.00
Source : « Histoire de Vie », INSEE, 2003 
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Table A5.  Average income of men by origin/region 
Region French Maghreb South Europe Other 
   
ILE DE FRANCE 26408 23148 22866 20281 
CHAMPAGNE-
ARDENNE 20006 17192 12613 16513 
PICARDIE 17252 13543 22707 20046 
HAUTE NORMANDIE 19342 11695 17928 24453 
CENTRE 18444 24381 21150 25760 
BASSE NORMANDIE 16360 19174 11708 20233 
BOURGOGNE 18822 6266 19712 21422 
NORD PAS DE 
CALAIS 16547 10025 14468 17548 
LORRAINE 19174 12303 18568 17086 
ALSACE 21559 18054 19223 20246 
FRANCHE COMTE 17789 12686 16602 18073 
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 18339 15100 13949 18620 
BRETAGNE 18837 14158 57379 14647 
POITOU CHARENTES 16374 21708 12797 21966 
AQUITAINE 18172 22024 17182 13547 
MIDI PYRENEES 18920 16981 15906 21913 
LIMOUSIN 15759 12417 15751 14818 
RHONE ALPES 21249 15108 16704 19868 
AUVERGNE 20035 12473 16797 15080 
LANGUEDOC 
ROUSSILLON 16176 14585 12835 17783 
PROVENCE ALPES 
COTE D AZUR 20933 14950 19714 22556 
CORSE 14332 14949 9457  
Ecart-type 2547 4458 9383 3265 
Source : « Histoire de Vie », INSEE, 2003 
Sample: male  population, 18 to 60 years old. 
Weighted statistics. 
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Tableau A6. Share of inactive people by origin/region 
 French Maghreb Southern Europe Other
 
ILE DE FRANCE 12 22 4 22
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNE 14 8 4 7
PICARDIE 17 28 0 2
HAUTE NORMANDIE 12 49 11 6
CENTRE 14 6 0 22
BASSE NORMANDIE 11 54 0 0
BOURGOGNE 10 39 3 23
NORD PAS DE CALAIS 9 22 13 18
LORRAINE 13 69 11 37
ALSACE 16 37 0 22
FRANCHE COMTE 19 22 0 25
PAYS DE LA LOIRE 8 52 0 37
BRETAGNE 13 5 0 18
POITOU CHARENTES 20 54 14 0
AQUITAINE 21 41 5 4
MIDI PYRENEES 13 16 0 33
LIMOUSIN 8 100 0 34
RHONE ALPES 8 17 16 29
AUVERGNE 10 21 0 48
LANGUEDOC ROUSSILLON 17 11 6 21
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D AZUR 14 17 34 1
CORSE 15 51 22 na 
Source : « Histoire de vie », INSEE, 2003 
Weighted statistics. 
Sample :male  population, 18 to 60 years old.. 
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Questions of the survey “Histoire de vie” 
1. Questions asked to the whole sample :  
First, among the topics that we have been talking about, which are the three topics that best correspond to you, that 
best describe who you are ? (maximum 3 answers, the order counts). 
- Your family  
- The places you are attached to ?  
- Your job, your professional situation, your education  
- Your friends 
- A passion, a regular leisure activity 
- Your physical appearance 
- A health problem, a handicap 
- Your geographical origin 
- Your political or religious opinions and commitment 
- Something else 
 
During the last 12months, how frequently have you been meeting, at your place or at theirs, or outside, 
friends of yours (or of your spouse)? 
Among those friends that you have just quoted, are some of them:  
Many possible answers, tick the chosen answers. 
1. neighbors ?  
2. former school-mates ?  
3. childhood friends ?  
4. persons coming from the same place as you ?  
5. people with whom you share the same values, the same way of living ?  
6. people of the same profession, or of the same professional group as you ?  
7. none of these categories of people  
 
When you were 15 years old, did your father (or the man that you consider like your father) work? 
1. Yes 
2. No, he did not work at that time 
3. No, he never worked 
4. Father unknown or absent 
 
 
2. Questions asked to the sub-sample of active persons, i.e. 4387 individuals. 
Nowadays, would yo usay that in your life in general, your job is: 
1. more important than anything else 
2. very important, but with parity with other things (family life, personal life, social life, etc.)  
3. is quite important but less important than other things (family life, personal life, social life, et.)  
4. is not important 
 
And now, everything considered, as a whole, in your current job, what is dominant? 
1. Satisfaction motives 
2. Dissatisfaction motives 
3. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction motives balance each other. 
 
